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BIVENS ACTIONS FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES IN THE 
AFTERMATH OF BUSH v. LUCAS: WHICH 
REMEDIES FOR WHOM? 
Barry F. Smitht 
The recognition of the Bivens-style action, or the constitu-
tional tort, has been followed by the Supreme Court's recent as-
sertion that these actions will be unavailable where Congress has 
established an elaborate remedial scheme that should not be 
augmented by a judicial remedy. The author of this article 
posits that this necessary limitation on Bivens actions may pro-
duce an ironic result in the area of public personnel. The author 
reasons that those employees whom Congress has determined 
warrant no statutory protection may be permitted to pursue more 
lucrative judicial remedies than those employees whom Congress 
has sought to protect. The author examines the development of 
the constitutional tort and explores the possible Bivens actions 
and defenses that will be available in the public personnel field. 
When statutory remedies are insufficient to preclude Bivens ac-
tions, the author concludes that Congress must act to retain effi-
ciency and fair treatment in the civil service. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics l is a ground-breaking case whose progeny should have been substan-
tially predictable. By recognizing a private cause of action for damages 
for violation of the fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable 
searches and seizures where no other remedies were available, Bivens rea-
sonably raised the assumption that causes of action would be recognized 
for violations of other constitutional rights in instances in which no other 
effective remedies were available.2 This assumption has proved largely 
t B.A., 1974, University of Montana; J.D., 1979, University of Montana School of 
Law; LL.M., 1982, Georgetown University Law Center; Attorney, U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development, Office of General Counsel, Litigation Divi-
sion, Washington, D.C.; Member, Montana State Bar. The author acknowledges 
his gratitude to Professors Bob Mullendore and Sandra Shapiro, whose creative 
ideas and enthusiasm inspired much of this article. 
1. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
2. Cj. id. at 428 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). These two 
dissenters expressed concern that the courts would be flooded with lawsuits for via-
414 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 14 
correct, as Bivens-style actions have been recognized as a means to re-
dress violations of most of the interests protected by the Bill of Rights. 3 
The recent cases of Bush v. Lucas4 and Chappell v. Wallaces exem-
plify a slowing of the expansion of Bivens-style actions that perhaps also 
should have been largely predictable. In refusing to allow private causes 
of action for damages for non-probationary civil service employees and 
military personnel, the Supreme Court was guided by the principle devel-
oped in previous Bivens-style cases that, absent special factors counsel-
ling hesitation, a private cause of action for damages is appropriate where 
there are no effective alternative remedies for the constitutional viola-
tion.6 The plaintiffs in Chappell, as enlisted military personnel, were al-
ready covered under the long-established military system of justice; the 
special nature of the military and its need to maintain discipline coun-
seled against a judicially created remedy.7 The plaintiff in Bush, a non-
probationary civil service employee in the "competitive service," had ex-
tensive procedural and substantive rights granted under a comprehensive 
statutory scheme developed over years of careful attention to the inter-
ests of federal employees in protecting their jobs and the interests of the 
public in maintaining a disciplined and efficient work force. 8 The results 
in these two cases, thus considered, were quite reasonable. 
Further reflection upon the implications of Bush, however, raises 
unsettling questions about Bivens actions in the area of public personnel. 
Many federal employees are not provided statutory remedies for adverse 
personnel actions because Congress has determined that their positions 
do not warrant such protection. To allow those employees to pursue the 
more lucrative Bivens-style remedies, as Bush seems to imply they can, is 
ironic in view of the treatment they received in the statutory scheme. 
Yet, it is arguable that those holding such unprotected positions are ex-
actly the individuals for whom Bivens actions are necessary. 
Bush thus raises fundamental questions about the interaction of stat-
utory and judicially created remedies for violations of constitutional 
rights. Can the silence of Congress be interpreted as a decision that no 
lations of fourth amendment interests similar to that in Bivens. Chief Justice Bur-
ger's dissent was concerned with the need for Congress to create a remedy for fourth 
amendment violations in view of the "failure" of the exclusionary rule formulated in 
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and made applicable to the states in 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 412,416,422 (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting). 
3. For a discussion of the constitutional causes of action for damages allowed in the 
wake of Bivens, see infra text accompanying notes 16-52. 
4. 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983). 
5. 103 S. Ct. 2362 (1983). 
6. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 229 (1979). In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 
(1980), the Supreme Court stated that to preclude a Bivens-style remedy, the alter-
native remedy must be "explicitly declared" by Congress "to be a substitute for 
recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective." Id. at 18-
19 (emphasis in original). 
7. Chappell, 103 S. Ct. at 2365-67. 
8. Bush, 103 S. Ct. at 2416-17. 
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remedy is appropriate? How far can Congress go to preclude the crea-
tion of judicial remedies? 
This article analyzes the various Bivens-style actions available in the 
area of public personnel administration and considers whether the cur-
rent statutory remedies, in the wake of the Bush decision, are sufficient to 
effectuate employee rights and thereby preclude Bivens actions. Where 
those statutory remedies are not so sufficient, it is suggested that Con-
gress would be wise to act in order to protect those supervisors subject to 
personal liability and to promote more efficient personnel administration. 
First, it will be helpful to have in mind the basic principles of this com-
plex area of law. 
II. PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR THE 
INFRINGEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION: A NEW 
REMEDY FOR OLD RIGHTS 
The growth in the types of private causes of action implied from the 
Constitution in the decade since Bivens was decided has been spectacular. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized causes of action im-
plied from the fourth,9 fifth,1O and eighth 11 amendments, and lower 
courts have recognized causes of action implied from the first,12 sixth,13 
and fourteenth l4 amendments. ls Continued expansion of the causes of 
action allowed very likely will continue absent action by the Supreme 
Court or Congress, and, notwithstanding the Bush and Chappell cases, 
the area of public personnel administration is fertile ground in which 
much of that expansion may occur. 
A. Growth of the "Common Law" of Constitutional Torts 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics l6 answered the question not addressed by its predecessor case, Bell v. 
9. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971). 
10. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
11. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
12. See, e.g., Kuczo v. Western Conn. Broadcasting Co., 424 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Conn. 
1976), rev'd on other grounds, 566 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1977). 
13. See, e.g., Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D. D.C. 1976). 
14. See, e.g., Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1977). Since the case of Monell v. 
Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which held that municipalities fall 
within the definition of "person" in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) and are thus subject to 
liability under that statute for violations of constitutional rights of "persons," courts 
have generally refused to imply causes of action against municipalities under the 
fourteenth amendment. See Annot., 64 L. ED. 2d 872, 892 § 10 (1981). 
15. For a collection of Bivens-style cases and an overview of their holdings, see Leh-
mann, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of a Constitutional Cause of Action for 
Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4 HAsTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 531 (1977); 
Annot., 64 L. ED. 2d 872 (1981). 
16. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
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Hood,17 twenty-five years earlier. Bell had held that the plaintiffs' com-
plaint for damages against members of the FBI for alleged violations of 
their fourth and fifth amendment rights stated a claim arising under "the 
Constitution or laws of the United States"18 for purposes of federal juris-
diction; Bell did not decide, however, whether the complaint stated a 
claim upon which relief could be granted. Although the district court 
decided upon remand of the Bell case that such a claim was not stated,19 
Bivens had the final word in ruling that, in some cases at least, private 
suits for damages against federal officials for violations of fourth amend-
ment rights may be maintained.2o 
Bivens brought his suit after the defendants entered his apartment 
one morning under claim of federal authority, arrested him for alleged 
violations of narcotics laws, manacled him in front of his wife and chil-
dren, searched the entire apartment, and took him to a federal court-
house where he was questioned, booked, and subjected to a strip search. 
Seeking $15,000 in damages from each defendant, Bivens alleged in his 
complaint that the arrest was illegal, which the Court read to mean with-
out probable cause as required by the fourth amendment.21 
In upholding Bivens's complaint, the five-justice majority first re-
jected the view that Bivens's remedy should be one created under state 
law.22 The court further noted that state laws on trespass and invasion of 
privacy operate differently from, and may be inconsistent with, the 
fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. 23 
The fourth amendment issue in the case thus was viewed as more than a 
mere limitation to the agents' defense to a state law claim; rather, it pro-
vided a basis for an "independent claim both necessary and sufficient to 
make out the plaintiff's cause of action."24 Finally, the Court noted that 
the damages remedy has historically been regarded as the ordinary rem-
edy for the invasion of personal interests in liberty, and that there were 
no special considerations that should cause the Court hesitation, in the 
absence of congressional action, to declare Bivens's right to recover 
money damages upon establishing that his injuries were caused by a 
fourth amendment violation.25 
Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in the judgment, provided a most 
17. 327 U.S. 678 (1946). 
18. [d. at 684-85 (applying 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1940) (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331(a) (1982»). 
19. Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813, 820 (S.D. Cal. 1947). 
20. For a probing analysis and critique of the decision by the district court in the Bell 
case on remand, see Katz, The Jurisprudence 0/ Remedies: Constitutional Legality 
and the Law a/Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1968). The Katz article 
was cited by both the majority and concurring opinions in Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396, 
400,407. 
21. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389-90 n.l. 
22. [d. at 394. 
23. [d. at 394-95. 
24. [d. at 395. 
25. [d. at 395-97. 
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interesting analysis of the case. He, too, concluded that a private cause 
of action for damages for the vindication of the violation of fourth 
amendment rights was proper, but his reasoning was somewhat different. 
For him, there was no question that the interest Bivens sought to protect 
was a federal right; the issue was one of separation of powers - whether 
the power to authorize damages is reserved solely to Congress, or 
whether the judiciary may authorize damage suits by implication.26 
Justice Harlan noted that the Court had previously authorized dam-
age suits for statutory violations when it deemed it necessary to effectuate 
congressional policy, and added that the fact that an interest is protected 
by the Constitution rather than a statute or the common law should not 
render the federal courts powerless to authorize damage actions.27 He 
was also influenced by the fact that Congress's grant of equitable reme-
dial powers to the federal judiciary28 resulted in a determination that the 
scope of equitable remedial jurisdiction should be coextensive with the 
scope of historical equitable jurisdiction. By the same token, he noted, 
the general grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts29 should be suffi-
cient to empower them to grant traditional remedies at law.30 
Justice Harlan supported his analysis with a practical point: without 
a cause of action for damages, Bivens would have no remedy at all. 31 
Equitable relief would have been ineffective to remedy Bivens's past in-
jury, the government was immune from suit by Bivens,32 and the exclu-
sionary rule, the usual application of the protection of the fourth 
amendment, could not help Bivens if charges were not pressed against 
h· 33 lffi. 
For all their eloquence, the opinions of the majority and Justice 
Harlan gave little guidance as to where the Court ultimately might draw 
the line restricting the authorization of constitutional torts. Justice 
Harlan did note, however, that the violation of constitutional interests 
other than those protected by the fourth amendment may not necessarily 
26. Id. at 400-02 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
27. Id. at 402-03. 
28. Id. at 404 (discussing Act of May 8, 1792, § 2, 1 Stat. 276). 
29. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 405 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970». As amended in 
1980, section 1331 now states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). . 
30. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 405. 
31. Id. at 409-10. 
32. Id. at 410. The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") was amended in 1974 to allow 
lawsuits against the federal government for intentional torts committed by federal 
law enforcement officers, see 28 U.S.C. § 268O(h) (1982), but the legislative history 
indicates that the new FTCA provision was not meant to preclude future Bivens-
style actions against those officials. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-20 (1980). 
33. For an interesting analysis of the use of the Constitution as a device for authorizing 
"affirmative" causes of action rather than just as a means of "nullification," see 
Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARv. L. REv. 
1532 (1972). 
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be the sort in which courts can determine causation and injury.34 
Eight years after Bivens, however, in Davis v. Passman,3S the Court 
upheld a private cause of action based on a violation of the fifth amend-
ment's equal protection component, where a former congressman had 
fired his deputy administrative assistant because the congressman 
deemed it essential that that employee be male.36 Even though the ma-
jority and concurring opinions in Bivens had relied on a previous holding 
that implied a private cause of action for damages from a statute,37 the 
Davis Court rejected the lower court's use of the criteria announced in 
Cort v. Ash38 for implying private causes of action for damages from stat-
utes.39 Davis held that the lower court had erred in denying Davis's 
cause of action simply because Congress had not created a damages rem-
edy for litigants in her situation and in concluding that it was improper 
to create such a remedy when it was not compelled by the Constitution.40 
Davis made it clear that the analysis required to imply causes of action 
from constitutional provisions is unique - it is solely concerned with 
how to effectuate constitutional rights. 
With little discussion of how Bivens guided its result, the Davis 
Court held: 
At least in the absence of "a textually demonstrable constitu-
tional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political de-
partment," Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), we 
presume that justiciable constitutional rights are to be enforced 
through the courts. And, unless such rights are to become 
merely precatory, the class of those litigants who allege that 
their own constitutional rights have been violated, and who at 
the same time have no effective means other than the judiciary to 
enforce these rights, must be able to invoke the existing jurisdic-
tion of the courts for the protection of their justiciable constitu-
tional rights.41 
Davis thus established a presumption of entitlement to a damages 
remedy in court when a constitutional right has been violated and no 
remedy exists in a "coordinate political department" (such as an admin-
34. 403 U.S. at 409 n.9. 
35. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
36. Id. at 248-49. 
37. 403 U.S. at 397, passim (citing 1.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), in which 
the Court implied a private cause of action for a shareholder damaged as a result of 
a false and misleading proxy statement issued in violation of section 14(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982». 
38. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). 
39. Davis, 442 U.S. at 240-41. The Court set forth that "the question of who may en-
force a statutory right is fundamentally different than the question of who may en-
force a right that is protected by the Constitution." Id. at 241 (emphasis in 
original). 
40. Id. at 245-48. 
41. Id. at 242 (emphasis added). 
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istrative agency). The Court indicated that the plaintiff bears the burden 
of showing that he has "no effective means other than the jUdiciary" to 
enforce the constitutional rights in question.42 
A year later, however, in Carlson v. Green,43 the Court indicated 
that a different approach was appropriate. In considering whether to al-
Iowa Bivens-style action for an eighth amendment violation (in that case, 
rendering incompetent medical attention to a prisoner, thereby causing 
his death), the Court set forth two situations in which a Bivens cause of 
action may be defeated: when defendants "demonstrate 'special factors 
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Con-
gress,"'44 and second, "when the defendants show that Congress has pro-
vided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute 
for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally 
effective. "45 
The language concerning the lack of "special factors counselling 
hesitation in the absence of affinnative action by Congress" was used in 
Bivens in a general sense to support its analysis in taking the novel step of 
implying a private cause of action from the Constitution.46 Davis con-
strued the language as a criterion held by Bivens for implying a private 
cause of action "in appropriate circumstances," or, apparently, when an 
award of damages is necessary to effectuate the violated constitutional 
right and when it is judicially manageable to do SO.47 
The language concerning an "equally effective" alternative remedy 
supplied by Congress was used in Bivens to refute the defendant official's 
contention that the issue was whether an award of money damages was 
necessary to enforce the fourth amendment.48 Bivens did not discuss ex-
plicit alternative remedies as a means for a defendant official to defeat a 
cause of action. 
As a result of Carlson, the plaintiff's burden of pleading a cause of 
action and proving a prima facie case became simpler. Carlson set forth 
that the plaintiff must allege only the circumstances under which a con-
stitutional right has been violated; it is the defendant's burden to estab-
lish49 that there are "special factors counselling hesitation" or that 
Congress has provided a remedy "explicitly declared to be a substitute 
42. Id. It should be noted, however, that the claim in Davis was upheld even though the 
plaintiff did not plead that she had "no effective means other than the judiciary" to 
obtain a remedy and even though the defendant had filed a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See id. at 232. 
43. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
44. Id. at 18 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396, and Davis, 442 U.S. at 245). 
45. 446 U.S. at 18-19 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396, and Davis, 442 U.S. at 245-47) 
(emphasis added). 
46. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. 
47. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 245. 
48. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. 
49. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant would need to raise his 
defense as a legal issue under a FED. R. CIV. P.12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.s. 228 
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for recovery under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective."50 
As will be seen in the discussion of Bush v. LucasS1 below, the require-
ment that defendants must raise these legal defenses remains important, 
but the effect of Carlson has been substantially softened. 52 
B. The Potential for Congressional Action 
Once Bivens had opened the door, there was little, either in the Con-
stitution or in statutory enactments, to ward off expansion of the per-
sonal liability of public officials for violating various provisions of the 
Constitution. Bivens declared that "constitutional tort" suits were prop-
erly within the province of the federal courts, and ever since, all determi-
nation of the limitations and powers in this area of law has come from 
the jUdiciary. The result has been the rapid creation of a body of "federal 
common law"53 of constitutional torts, completely unchecked by Con-
gress, and unguided by a system of clear, consistent principles of law 
developed over time. 
Article III of the Constitution declares that the judicial power of the 
federal courts "shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution [and] the Laws of the United States .... "54 A 
Bivens-style lawsuit, "almost paradigmatically," is a case "arising under" 
the Constitution. 55 Once the Supreme Court had recognized it as such, it 
would only be through some appropriate exercise of the legislative power 
by Congress that the Court would be restricted in its authority to extend 
or narrow the scope of such suits. The source of this legislative power is 
presumably in the Article I and III grants of power to create lower fed-
eral courts56 and to make all laws that are "necessary and proper" for 
doing so. 57 Although the extent of the power of Congress to limit the 
courts' authority to decide certain cases is still a controversial issue,58 the 
Court has recognized this congressional power in at least procedural ar-
(1979), or more likely, under a FED. R. CIV. P. 56 motion for summary judgment, 
Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983). 
50. 446 U.S. at 18, 19. 
51. 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983). 
52. See infra text accompanying notes 87-93. 
53. Although in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Court remarked that 
"[t]here is no federal general common law," id. at 78, later case law has shown that 
there may be a federal common law developed in specific areas. See, e.g., Textile 
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (concluding that sec-
tion 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 empowered thejudici-
ary to fashion a federal substantive law of collective bargaining agreements). 
Lincoln Mills was cited by Justice Harlan in his Bivens concurring opinion. 403 
U.S. at 403 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
54. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
55. Dellinger, supra note 33, at 1541. 
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art III, § 1. 
57. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8. 
58. See Hilts, AMA Decides to Oppose Bill Defining Human Life as Starting at Concep-
tion, Wash. Post, June 8, 1981, at A4, col. 5, concerning one group's reaction to the 
movement in Congress to limit the power of federal courts to hear challenges to 
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eas. S9 Furthermore, given the language in Bivens and its progeny indicat-
ing that Bivens-style actions serve to fill a remedial void left by 
Congress's inaction,6O the Supreme Court probably would welcome any 
efforts by Congress to provide alternative remedies for constitutional 
violations. 
As shown in the following discussion of Bush, the requirements in 
Carlson that the congressional remedy be "explicitly declared to be a sub-
stitute for recovery directly under the Constitution"61 and be viewed as 
"equally effective"62 were short-lived. The Court showed in Bush that 
the important factor is not the explicit declaration of Congress, but 
rather the goal Congress addressed in establishing the "elaborate reme-
dial system" giving the plaintiff his administrative remedy.63 Where a 
basic congressional policy, rather than a specific congressional statement, 
indicates that the statutory remedy is deemed complete, the Court will 
not initiate an additional remedy. As will be argued, the current reme-
dial scheme, presumably considered "complete" by Congress, has signifi-
cant weaknesses that practically invite a multitude of Bivens-style actions 
to be filed. If so, new legislation is in order. 
abortion laws in the wake of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), by declaring in 
legislation when "life," for purposes ofthe fifth and fourteenth amendments, begins. 
59. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982». "In provid-
ing remedies and defining procedure in relation to cases and controversies in the 
constitutional sense the Congress is acting within its delegated power over the juris-
diction of the federal courts which the Congress is authorized to establish." 300 
U.S. at 240. 
60. See, e.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 ("[w]e have here no explicit congressional declara-
tion that persons injured by a federal officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment 
... [are] remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress."); 
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1979) ("[t]here is in this case 'no explicit 
congressional declaration that persons' in petitioner'S position injured by unconsti-
tutional federal employment discrimination 'may not recover money damages from' 
those responsible for the injury") (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397) (emphasis in origi-
nal); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980) (a Bivens-style action may be 
defeated "when defendants show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy 
which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Consti-
tution and viewed as equally effective" (emphasis in original) (citing Bivens, 403 
U.S. at 397». 
It is unusual that Carlson required that congressional intent to create an alter-
native remedy be explicit, either in the text of the remedial statute in question or in 
its legislative history. Congress conceivably could intend a remedy to be alternative, 
rather than supplementary, to a Bivens-style action, and yet not be explicit about its 
purpose. Carlson probably did not have to go as far as it did on this point, consider-
ing the clarity of intent expressed in the legislative history of the FICA amendment 
in question. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19-20, 25-29 (powell, J., concurring); cf Bush 
v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404,2410-11 (1983) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 
87-94). 
61. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980). 
62. Id. at 19. 
63. Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 2416 (1983). 
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III. BIVENS-STYLE ACTIONS FOR PUBLIC PERSONNEL: 
THE CONTEXT OF BUSH V. LUCAS 
A. The Modern Civil Service 
Administrative efficiency, a goal of large bureaucratic institutions 
such as the United States government, often fosters neglect of the 
"human element" that is essential to the very efficiency those institutions 
seek. Ignoring that human element in the lower echelon, a large bureau-
cracy evolves in its higher levels, which comprises the only positions of 
true power in the present-day political and technological systems.64 
It is unfair, however, to over-generalize about the motives of those 
"functionaries" and experts who assume positions of power. They can be 
pawns of the bureaucratic structure they administer just as much as 
those who work under them. A number of factions can depend on the 
"functionaries" to do their jobs well, and can create significant pressure 
upon them to perform efficiently in their assigned roles.6s This is cer-
tainly true of personnel administrators in the federal government today. 
Government simply cannot function without adequate performance from 
its personnel. Regulated industry in the private sector, members of the 
taxpaying public, superior and coordinate agencies, and other govern-
mental employees all suffer when the ineffectiveness of a personnel ad-
ministrator causes poor employee performance. 
To say that the personnel officer has the power of termination to 
solve problems in employee performance is too simplistic. If government 
had the absolute power of termination, it would face the additional prob-
lem of attracting competent personnel. Furthermore, federal employees 
have amassed a variety of procedural and substantive protections, the 
satisfaction of which requires experienced and careful handling. A fed-
eral personnel officer is thus forced to maintain a most delicate balance 
between public needs and demands for effective performance by the gov-
ernment on one hand, and legally protected interests of employees on the 
other. 
The vast majority of federal employees, as well as many in state, 
county, and city governments, are within the "competitive" civil ser-
vice.66 Under this system, employees who have completed a year of pro-
bationary service are generally protected from discharge, except "for 
64. See R. HUMMEL, THE BUREAUCRATIC EXPERIENCE 190 (1982). 
65. It has been argued that the modern "bureaucratic manager," wielding scientific-like 
skill in the performance of his managerial tasks, is but a mythological character 
created out of a technological society'S misguided faith in the amoral scientific ap-
proach. See A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 28-29 (1984). Under this view, it 
would seem that those attempting to obtain the impossible objectives of this charac-
ter role are subject to much frustration and criticism. If they are also expected to 
conform with scientific-like accuracy to the requirements of the Constitution, they 
are subject to substantial liability in Bivens-style actions. Under Bush v. Lucas, 103 
S. Ct. 2404 (1983), little relief from such liability should be anticipated. See infra 
text accompanying notes 95-114. 
66. See Frog, Does the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service Employees?, 
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such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service."67 The Civil 
Service Reform Act of 197868 retained this language, which originated in 
the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912.69 The principles in this language are 
thus firmly embedded in the law and administration of the United States 
civil service.'o 
B. Bivens Actions After Bush v. Lucas 
1. Factual Background and Holding 
The petitioner in Bush v. Lucas,71 an aerospace engineer at NASA's 
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama, had been demoted, 
he alleged, in retaliation for several public statements he had made con-
cerning his work and the work of the employing agency.'2 He appealed 
his demotion to the Civil Service Commission's Federal Employee Ap-
peals Authority, which upheld the agency's action. Two years later, he 
was granted review by the Commission's Appeals Review Board. The 
Board balanced, on the one hand, the evidence tending to show that 
Bush's motive may have been one of personal gain and that his state-
ments caused some disruption of the agency's function with, on the other 
hand, the idea that society and the individual both have an interest in 
free speech, including a right to disclose information concerning the effi-
cient operation of an important governmental agency. Finding that 
Bush's statements, although somewhat exaggerated, did not merit his 
dismissal for his exercise of free speech, the Board recommended that 
Bush be restored to his former position and receive a back pay award. 73 
Before the Board reached its decision, Bush filed a lawsuit against 
his supervisor in state court for damages, and alleged in a Bivens-style 
cause of action that his first amendment right of free speech had been 
violated.74 After the case was removed to federal district court, sum-
124 U. PA. L. REv. 942, 945 (1976) (citing Merrill, Procedures/or Adverse Actions 
Against Federal Employers, 59 VA. L. REv. 196 (1973». 
67. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (1982). 
68. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111, 1136 (1978) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1101-8913 
(1982». 
69. Pub. L. No. 62-336, 37 Stat. 539, 555 (1912) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5595, 7101, 
7102, 7501 (1982». 
70. For a detailed history of the United States civil service, see Frog, supra note 66, at 
947-77; see also Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 2412-15 (1983). 
71. 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983). 
72. Id. at 2406-07. The petitioner had made several public statements, some in televised 
interviews, that he did not have enough meaningful work, that his job was "a trav-
.esty and worthless," and that taxpayers' money was being spent fraudulently and 
wastefully by his employing agency. Id. at 2406. He made these statements during 
the processing of his administrative appeals from reassignments made as part of a 
facility reorganization. Id. 
73. Id. at 2407. 
74. Id. The report of the case by the court of appeals shows that the defamation claim 
was based on the defendant's reponse to a television reporter about the statement 
concerning not having enough meaningful work. He replied: "I have had [Bush's] 
statement investigated and I can say unequivocally that such a statement has no 
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mary judgment was rendered on behalf of the defendant supervisor. Ac-
cording to the court, there was no entitlement to a constitutional remedy 
because of the administrative procedure provided in the Civil Service 
Commission's regulations. 75 
A unanimous Supreme Court opinion, authored by Mr. Justice Ste-
vens, began by assuming that Bush's first amendment rights were vio-
lated by the demotion, that his administrative remedies were not as 
complete as a damages remedy provided in a Bivens-style action, and that 
his administrative remedies did not fully compensate him "for the harm 
he suffered."76 The issue, however, was "not what remedy the court 
should provide for a wrong that would otherwise go unredressed," but 
rather "whether an elaborate remedial system that has been constructed 
step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations, 
should be augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy for the 
constitutional violation at issue. "77 
The Court discussed in detail the administrative remedies provided 
by Civil Service Commission regulations for employees in the federal 
competitive service,78 These included the right to a trial-type hearing 
before the Federal Employee Appeals Authority, whose decisions were 
reviewable by a federal district court or the Court of Claims, and the 
right to request the Civil Service Commission's Appeals Review Board to 
reopen an adverse decision by the Federal Employee Appeals Author-
ity.79 The Court then acknowledged the financial, time, and energy costs 
basis in fact." Bush v. Lucas, 598 F.2d 958, 959 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 
2404 (1983). 
75. Bush, 103 S. Ct. at 2408. 
76. Id. The Court noted that Bush claimed damages for "emotional and dignitary 
harms" and attorney's fees that were not compensated for by the administrative 
remedy. Id. at n.9. 
77. Id. at 2416. 
78. Id. at 2415-16. 
79. Id. (citing 5 C.F.R. §§ 752.203, 772.101, 772.307(c), 772.310 (1975». Bush, as a 
non-probationary employee in the federal competitive service, was initially entitled 
to 30 days written notice of the proposed adverse action, stating the reasons for that 
proposed action. He then had the right to review the materials the agency relied 
upon in making the charge, to answer the charge with a statement and affidavits, 
and to appear at an oral non-evidentiary proceeding before an agency official. 103 S. 
Ct. at 2415-16 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 752.202(a), (b) (1975». The final agency decision 
had to be made by an official of higher rank than the one proposing the action. 103 
S. Ct. at 2416 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 752.202(f) (1975»; see generally Merrill, Procedures 
for Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59 VA. L. REv. 196 (1973). The 
notice and answer provisions remain substantially the same under the Civil Service 
Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1101-8913 (1982). See 5 U.S.c. §§ 7511-13 
(1982); 5 C.F.R. §§ 752.301-.401 (1984). 
One significant difference under the prior law was that it allowed an emergency 
suspension of an employee during the processing of the termination when retention 
of the employee could be "injurious" to himself, his fellow workers, or the general 
public, or could result in damage to government property. 5 C.F.R. § 752.404(b)(3) 
(1975). In Cuellar v. United States Postal Service, XI Fed. Merit Sys. Rep. 242 
(MSPB Nov. 13, 1981), the Merit Systems Protection Board held that this regula-
tion was invalid and inconsistent with the power given to the Office of Personnel 
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to the government and to managerial personnel associated with the re-
view of disciplinary decisions in the administrative process and con-
cluded, apparently on the basis of logic rather than on evidence in the 
record, that "it is quite probable that if management personnel face the 
added risk of personal liability for decisions that they believe to be a 
correct response to improper criticism of the agency, they would be de-
terred from imposing discipline in future cases. "80 
The Court ultimately deferred to the congressional solution. It ac-
knowledged that Congress has "considerable familiarity" with balancing 
the need for governmental efficiency with employees' rights, as well as 
having access to fact-finding procedures not available to the courts.8! 
Further, the Court stressed that Congress also has a "special interest" in 
keeping informed about the efficiency and morale of the executive 
branch, and that Congress is capable of making an "evenhanded assess-
ment of the desirability of creating a new remedy for federal employees 
who have been demoted or discharged for expressing controversial 
views."82 The Court concluded that Congress was "in a better position 
Management to issue regulations, as it conflicted with 5 U.S.C. § 7513 of the new 
Act. The new Act allows a shortened notice period when "there is reasonable cause 
to believe the employee has committed a crime for which a sentence of imprison-
ment may be imposed," id., but does not provide for emergency suspensions. It may 
be noted that the first extensive use of the shortened notice provision was by the 
Federal Aviation Administration during the processing of the terminations of 
11,500 air traffic controllers accused of engaging in the August, 1981 strike. See 
General Notice 1/129, sent from FAA national and regional offices to local air traf-
fic control facilities, August 5, 1981. 
A different procedure is established under the 1978 Act for the appeals of ad-
verse actions (defined in 5 U.S.C. § 7512 (1982) as removals, suspensions of more 
than 14 days, reductions in grade or pay, and furloughs up to 30 days). An appeal 
from the agency's action is heard initially by a presiding official of the MSPB in a 
hearing in which the employing agency assumes the burden of proving by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that its action was proper. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(I) (1982); 5 
C.F.R. § 1201.56(a)(ii) (1984). The new law sets forth three affirmative defenses 
which, if proved, entitle the appellant to prevail even if the agency carries its burden 
of proof: (1) where "harmful error in the application of the agency's procedures" in 
taking the adverse action is shown; (2) where it is shown that the action was based 
on a "prohibited personnel practice," as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (1982) (such 
as discriminating on the basis of sex, age, or racial status; coercing political activity; 
or taking action which constitutes a reprisal against a "whistleblower," someone 
who discloses mismanagement and violation of the law in his agency); and (3) where 
it is shown that the action was "not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2) 
(1982). 
An employee may appeal the presiding official's decision to the Board by filing 
a petition for review within 30 days. 5 U.S.C. § 77Ol(e)(I)(A) (1982). Judicial re-
view of the Board's decisions, available only to an "employee or applicant for em-
ployment adversely affected or aggrieved" by such a decision, is available in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(I), 
(b)(I) (1982). 
80. 103 S. Ct. at 2417. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. It is interesting to note the care the Court took to emphasize Congress's protec-
tion for a limited group of adverse actions - those brought against "federal employ-
ees who have been demoted or discharged for expressing controversial views." Id. 
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to decide whether or not the public interest would be served by creating 
[a new substantive legal liability]." 83 
A concurring opinion filed by Justice Marshall, joined in by Justice 
Blackmun, emphasized that the case would be a different one "if Con-
gress had not created a comprehensive scheme that was specifically 
designed to provide full compensation to civil service employees who are 
discharged or disciplined in violation of their First Amendment rights 
. . . and that affords a remedy that is substantially as effective as a dam-
age action."84 In arguing that the administrative remedies were "sub-
stantially" as effective as an individual damages remedy, the concurring 
opinion noted the administrative advantages of placing the burden of 
proof on the agency rather than on the employee, removing the obstacle 
of qualified immunity that would exist in a civil suit,85 and providing a 
speedier and less costly forum. 86 
2. Immediate Implications of Bush 
a. A Softening of Carlson 
Bush implicitly departed from the seemingly unequivocal stance the 
Court took in Carlson v. Green87 concerning the circumstances that 
would "defeat" a Bivens-style cause of action.88 Without the benefit of 
supporting authority and rationale, the Bush Court stated: 
This much is established by our prior cases. The federal 
courts' statutory jurisdiction to decide federal questions confers 
adequate power to award damages to the victim of a constitu-
tional violation. When Congress provides an alternative rem-
edy, it may, of course, indicate its intent, by statutory language, 
by clear legislative history, or perhaps even by the statutory 
remedy itself, that the Court's power should not be exercised. 
In the absence of such a congressional directive, the federal 
courts must make the kind of remedial determination that is 
appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying particular heed, 
however, to any special factors counselling hesitation before au-
thorizing a new kind of federal litigation. 89 
This hardly seems necessary, as the "comprehensive scheme" established by Con-
gress covered more than just "whistleblowers." As will be seen, the important limi-
tation on the holding in Bush is the status of the employee, and not the type of 
conduct that resulted in the adverse action. See infra text accompanying notes 9S-
114. 
83. 103 S. Ct. at 2417. 
84. Id. at 2417-18 (Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring). 
8S. Id. at 2418 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978». 
86. 103 S. Ct. at 2418. The concurring opinion also argued that these advantages were 
not "clearly outweighed" by the disadvantages of no option for a jury trial and only 
limited judicial review rather than a full trial in federal court. Id. 
87. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
88. See supra text accompanying notes SO-S2. 
89. 103 S. Ct. at 2411. 
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In acknowledging that Congress can "indicate its intent. . even by the 
statutory remedy itself,"90 the Court turned away from the Carlson lan-
guage emphasizing "explicit" congressional deliberations that certain 
statutory remedies were intended to be exclusive and were viewed as 
"equally effective" as constitutional remedies. 
The Bush Court further departed from the Carlson language by not-
ing that "Congress has not resolved the question presented by this case 
by expressly denying petitioner the judicial remedy he seeks or by provid-
ing him with an equally effective substitute."91 The disjunctive "or" was 
not used in Carlson, and its use in Bush only emasculates the effect of 
Carlson's emphasis on "explicitly declared" alternative remedies.92 
The Court then turned to the "catch-all" category of "special fac-
tors counselling hesitation" and found such factors in abundance. In 
view of the "comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions giving 
meaningful remedies against the United States,"93 and in view of its opin-
ion that "Congress is in a better position to decide whether or not the 
public interest would be served" by allowing Bush's cause of action,94 the 
Court upheld summary judgment for the defendant official. Its detailed 
discussion of the history of the federal civil service and its analysis of the 
administrative remedies available to Bush gave the Court ample cause to 
"hesitate" before allowing a judicial remedy. 
Bush is therefore significant as an illustration of how the Court in-
terprets the concept of "special factors counseiling hesitation." Most 
significant, however, is not how Bush altered the impact of Carlson or 
defined the "special factors" concept, but how it clouded the picture for 
those cases involving federal employees not covered by a "comprehen-
sive" administrative remedial scheme. Bush, it turns out, is a case preg-
nant with repercussions. 
h. Little Impact on Other Employee Classifications 
As previously mentioned,9s federal employees within the federal 
"competitive service" are subject to "adverse actions"96 only for "such 
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service."97 Subchapter II of 
Title 5, Chapter 75, of the United States Code98 and the regulations 
promulgated thereunder99 currently set forth the procedures agencies 
90. [d. 
91. [d. (emphasis added). 
92. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 31 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) ("I cannot escape the conclu-
sion that in future cases the Court will be obliged to retreat from the language of 
today's decision."). 
93. 103 S. Ct. at 2406. 
94. [d. at 2417. 
95. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69. 
96. As defined in 5 U.S.C. § 7512 (1982); see supra note 79. 
97. 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (1982). 
98. [d. §§ 7511-14 (1982). 
99. 5 C.F.R. §§ 752.301-.406 (1984). 
428 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 14 
must follow in effecting adverse actions for employees in the competitive 
service. Chapter 77100 sets forth the procedures for appealing an 
agency's decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board and, ultimately, 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal CircUit. lOl 
Bush, as a non-probationary employee in the competitive service, 102 
was entitled to the administrative remedies then in effect for those em-
ployees subject to adverse actions. The scope of coverage of those reme-
dies, of course, was determinative in his case, as the Supreme Court was 
guided by the comprehensive remedial scheme with which he was pro-
vided. Therefore, had he been a probationary employee (essentially, 
someone in the competitive service for less than one year)103 or a member 
of the excepted service,I04 he would not have had access to the adminis-
trative remedial process, lOS and the outcome of his case likely would have 
been different. 
Numerous positions in the civil service are excepted from the com-
petitive service and, therefore, are not protected by the "efficiency of the 
service" standard or by the elaborate remedial provisions applying to ad-
100. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701-03 (1982). 
101. For further details on these procedures, see supra note 79. 
102. For the relevant statutory definitions, see infra notes 103 and 104. 
103. An "employee" entitled to the statutory adverse action procedures is defined in 5 
U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1) (1982) as follows: 
(A) an individual in the competitive service who is not serving a pro-
bationary or trial period under an initial appointment or who has com-
pleted 1 year of current continuous employment under other than a 
temporary appointment limited to 1 year or less; and 
(B) a preference eligible in an Executive agency in the excepted ser-
vice, and a preference eligible in the United States Postal Service or the 
Postal Rate Commission, who has completed 1 year of current continuous 
service in the same or similar positions. . . . 
"Preference eligible," as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2108(3) (1983), includes veterans and 
certain relatives of veterans. 
104. 5 U.S.C. § 2102 (1982) states: 
(a) The "competitive service" consists of-
(1) all civil service positions in the executive branch, except-
(A) positions which are specifically excepted from the competitive 
service by or under statute; 
(B) positions to which appointments are made by nomination for con-
firmation by the Senate, unless the Senate otherwise directs; and 
(C) positions in the Senior Executive Service .... 
5 U.S.C. § 2103(a) (1982) defines the "excepted service" as "those civil service 
positions which are not in the competitive service or the Senior Executive Service." 
The regulations promulgated by the Office of Personnel Management further define 
the "excepted service" and establish three schedules of excepted positions. 5 C.F.R. 
§§ 213.3101-.3202 (1984). 
105. See Stern v. Department of the Army, 699 F.2d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (upholding 
the dismissal of the petitioner's appeal before the Merit Systems Protection Board 
for lack of jurisdiction where the petitioner was a civilian employee under a tempo-
rary appointment of less than one year and was not a preference eligible), cert. de-
nied, 103 S. Ct. 3095 (1983); see also Piskadlo v. Veterans Admin., 668 F.2d 82 (1st 
Cir. 1982) (MSPB had no jurisdiction over appeal of discharge of probationary 
employee). 
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verse actions in the competitive service. These positions include attor-
neys and law clerk trainees,I06 as well as numerous other positions "not 
of a confidential or policy-determining character" for which it is imprac-
tical to hold examinations or open competitions, or to apply the usual 
competitive procedures. I07 Furthermore, employees such as non-prefer-
ence eligible Postal Service employees and, of course, probationary em-
ployees in the competitive service are similarly unprotected. lOS 
None of these positions falls under the Bush analysis of being part of 
the "elaborate remedial system" protecting discharged or demoted em-
ployees, and it would seem that employees in these positions are there-
fore free to pursue Bivens-style remedies whenever applicable. The 
difficulty with this view is that Congress did not ignore these positions; it 
simply determined that they were not the sort of positions warranting the 
protection of the competitive service. If Congress determined these posi-
tions warranted less protection, it is anomalous, to say the least, that 
employees in these positions are entitled to pursue Bivens actions, which 
provide potentially greater remedial protection, while employees in the 
competitive service, where Congress has determined that greater protec-
tion is warranted, are limited to the pursuit of the applicable administra-
tive remedies. 109 
106. 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(d), (e) (1984). 
107. [d. §§ 213.3101, 213.3201 (1984). Also in the excepted service are positions "which 
are policy-determining or which involve a close and confidential working relation-
ship with the head of an agency or other key appointed officials." See supra note 
104. 
108. See 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(l) (1982) (quoted supra note 103). Preference eligible non-
probationary Postal Service employees may use the administrative remedies for ad-
verse actions. [d. They are thus subject to the same analysis as was Bush in at-
tempting to sustain a Bivens-style action. Even non-preference eligibles in the Postal 
Service are protected under a "just cause" provision in their collective bargaining 
agreement. In addition, the elaborate grievance and arbitration procedures set forth 
in their agreements effectively provide them the same protection as preference 
eligibles. See, e.g., Agreement Between U.S. Postal Service and American Postal 
Workers Union, AFL-CIO, Articles 15, 16 (July 21, 1981-July 20, 1984). 
109. For an example of a post-Bush case denying a Bivens-style action brought by a 
probationer because of this anomaly, see Francisco v. Schmidt, 575 F. Supp. 1200, 
1202-03 (E.D. Wis. 1983). In Francisco, the United States District Court for the 
District of Wisconsin held that it would not allow a probationary employee to pur-
sue a Bivens action based on an alleged first amendment violation because: 
the fact that the federal employer-employee relationship is involVed is a 
special factor that counsels hesitation, and this is so notwithstanding Con-
gress's decision to exclude probationary employees from its remedial 
scheme. The Supreme Court has determined that Congress is in a superior 
position for balancing the competing policy considerations in the context 
of federal employment disputes. It stands to reason that Congress's deci-
sion to exclude probationary employees from the statutory remedial 
scheme reflects an assessment of those considerations as they pertain to 
employees who have not fully demonstrated their competence or ability to 
interact with their co-workers and superiors. 
[d. The court was less concerned with the issue of "what remedy [it] should provide 
for a wrong that would otherwise go unredressed," see Bush, 103 S. Ct. at 2416, 
than with the implications of Congress's decision in the "elaborate remedial system" 
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It is no answer to assert, as did Justice Marshall in his concurring 
opinion in Bush v. Lucas,llo that the administrative remedies are "in 
many respects preferable" to a Bivens-style action. II I Neither the 
Court's opinion nor the concurring opinion challenged the proposition 
that a Bivens-style action, which has the potential for a jury trial, com-
pensatory and punitive damages, and recovery for emotional distress, of-
fers a more complete remedy than do the administrative remedial 
procedures. Quite clearly, the administrative remedy, although more ex-
pedient, is limited. 
It seems appropriate, however, to speculate that Bush will have little 
practical effect on the choice of remedies by employees seeking to vindi-
cate their rights. Most employees subject to an adverse action would 
probably prefer to appeal through the Merit Systems Protection Board 
procedures II 2 rather than to sue under a Bivens-style theory. Employees 
not eligible for a Merit Systems Protection Board proceeding will have to 
sue. As the following discussion indicates, there are few legal impedi-
ments to such suits when the facts present a constitutional violation. 
Given the variety of classifications of federal employees,113 it appears 
that Bush, in addressing only the right of a non-probationary employee in 
the competitive service to bring suit, left an incomplete analytical pic-
ture. 114 As discussed in the following material, there is a great variety of 
Bivens-style actions, each with different implications on the functioning 
of government, that can be brought in the area of public personnel. Only 
through a holistic analysis of all these actions and their implications 
could the Court issue a decision to complete the analytical picture left by 
Bush. It is not likely that cases will present themselves to the Court in 
such a manner. This, therefore, is an area crying out for congressional 
attention. 
C. Potential Bivens-Style Actions in the Public Personnel Field 
1. First Amendment Violations 
First amendment violations by personnel officers, as illustrated by 
negative implication in Bush, may provide a fertile ground for future Biv-
ens-style actions. Such violations occur in a variety of ways, including 
the termination of employees after a change of presidential administra-
tions llS and the suspension or termination of employees critical of their 
it constructed to give less protection to probationary employees. Other courts, in-
cluding the Supreme Court, see Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977), are likely to be more protective of first amend-
ment interests, in spite of congressional protections for whistleblowers. See infra 
text accompanying notes 200-14, 222-25. 
110. 103 S. Ct. at 2417 (Marshall, I., concurring). 
111. Id. at 2418. 
112. See supra note 79. 
113. See supra notes 104, 108. 
114. But see supra note 109. 
115. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (new public defender taking office 
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supervisors. 116 Meeting the first requirement of establishing a Bivens ac-
tion under the Carlson test - showing a constitutional violation (here, of 
the first amendment) - should be relatively easy. The Supreme Court 
has ruled that in order to meet his initial burden of proof, an employee 
claiming that his discharge resulted from protected first amendment ac-
tivity need only show that the complained-of conduct was a "substantial" 
or "motivating" factor in the discharge. 117 An employee so discharged is 
entitled to reinstatement even if he is not tenured. llB Mere reinstate-
ment, however, would not likely make an employee whole following a 
discharge or suspension for protected first amendment activity. Because 
of the Carlson concern that alternative remedies be "sufficient protec-
torrs] of the citizens' constitutional rights"ll9 before a Bivens-style cause 
of action should be precluded, it is highly likely that a Bivens action will 
be a favorable remedy in this area. 
2. Fourteenth Amendment Violations 
Initially, fourteenth amendment violations had been a major source 
of Bivens-style litigation against local officials, and it appeared that such 
actions were going to be as widespread as in the federal sector. The 
Supreme Court halted that trend in 1978 with its decision in Monell v. 
Department of Social Services. 120 Monell held that the word "person" in 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which gives a federal cause of action to those whose 
constitutional rights have been violated by any "person" under "color" 
of state law, includes within its scope municipalities.l2l This decision 
gave plaintiffs injured by unconstitutional acts of municipal employees a 
direct cause of action against the municipalities, so long as the suits were 
not based on respondeat superior theories. 122 Many cases have since held 
that Bivens-style actions against municipal officials are precluded when 
section 1983 suits are thus available.123 In accord with the eleventh 
amendment, Monell did not extend its interpretation of section 1983 to 
after election could not dismiss assistants because of their party affiliation when 
there was no demonstration that party affiliation was an appropriate requirement for 
effective performance). 
116. See, e.g., Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1979) (suspension of employee 
for complaining of "AMWAY ring" being run by supervisor at office was improper). 
"Whistleblowers" are given protection by the office of the Special Counsel of the 
Merit Systems Protection Board under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. See 5 
U.S.C. § 1206 (1982); see also Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) 
(school teacher could not be terminated for having written partially erroneous letter 
to local newspaper criticizing school board's actions). 
117. Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). 
118. [d. at 283·84. 
119. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. at 14,23 (1980). 
120. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
121. [d. at 690. 
122. [d. at 691. 
123. See, e.g., Cale v. City of Covington, 586 F.2d 311,317 (4th Cir. 1978); Mahone v. 
Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1024-25 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904 (1978); 
Bell v. City of Philadelphia, 511 F. Supp. 1156, 1160 (E.D.Pa. 1981). 
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local governmental units considered part of a state. 124 Thus, no federal 
cause of action is available against a state or its subdivisions for constitu-
tional violations. 
On the federal level, it appears that there are few areas of the Con-
stitution, at least in the Bill of Rights, that do not hold the potential for 
Bivens-style actions. So long as the violation of a constitutional right 
results in ascertainable damages, the portion of the Constitution violated 
probably can be the basis for a private cause of action against the culpa-
ble federal agent. 
3. Fifth Amendment Violations 
a. The Liberty Interest 
In alleging an infringement of a fifth amendment liberty interest 
through a personnel action, the general rule is that the employee must set 
forth that the charges against him that are the basis of the persomiel 
action are false12s and that they were made public in some form so as to 
impair his "good name, reputation, honesty, or integrity."126 The appli-
cation of this rule is illustrated in the 1976 case of Bishop v. Wood. 127 In 
Bishop, the Supreme Court held that because the allegedly stigmatizing 
charges against the plaintiff policeman (that his discharge was based on a 
failure to follow orders, poor attendance at training sessions, and con-
duct unsuited to an officer) were communicated orally to him in private, 
there was no dissemination of the charges sufficient to warrant a finding 
of an impairment of the plaintiff's reputation. 128 The Court would not 
speculate, as did two justices in dissent,129 as to whether the plaintiff's 
former employer might communicate the charges to prospective employ-
ers when asked about his record. The Court refused to allow itself to 
become "the appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of per-
sonnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies."130 
At this juncture, it is important to consider the implications of Doe 
v. United States Civil Service Commission,131 which, although occurring 
some four years after Bishop, indicated that a strict view of the "publica-
tion" requirement in Bishop may not always be followed. Doe held that a 
plaintiff stated a cause of action against officials of the Civil Service Com-
mission for damages incurred when the defendants' actions infringed the 
plaintiff's fifth amendment liberty interest without granting her a hear-
ing,132 which the court deemed constitutionally required under the 
124. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.54. 
125. See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627-28 (1977). 
126. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,348 & n.12 (1976) (quoting Wisconsin v. Con-
stantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971». 
127. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). 
128. [d. at 348-49. 
129. [d. at 351-52 (Brennan, I., dissenting). 
130. [d. at 349 & n.14. 
131. 483 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. N.Y. 1980). 
132. Id. at 575. 
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circumstances. 133 
In Doe, the plaintiff applied to the President's Commission on White 
House Fellowships for a White House Fellow position. Upon being se-
lected as one of the finalists for the position openings, she was subjected 
to a field investigation conducted by a Civil Service Commission bureau. 
She had authorized the investigation on the appropriate form. The bu-
reau interviewed more than thirty-five people familiar with Doe's charac-
ter and qualifications, most of whom gave favorable reports. Two of 
those contacted, however, reported that Doe had engaged in several acts 
of theft, both during college and at the current time. These sources used 
language such as "propensity to steal," "kleptomaniac," and "compul-
sive thief," all of which were placed in Doe's file. 134 
Doe was not offered the fellowship. She obtained her file pursuant 
to a Privacy Act l35 request and discovered the statements concerning her 
alleged thievery. She requested that the statements be deleted from her 
file for not meeting the accuracy requirements of the Privacy Act,136 and 
supplied several affidavits on her behalf refuting the incidents alleged by 
the two sources. The Civil Service Commission rejected the request, but 
included the affidavits in her file. 137 In a suit filed in federal district court 
against the Civil Service Commission, Doe alleged, among other things, 
that the conduct complained of violated her right to privacy and due 
process under the first, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. 138 She al-
leged that her liberty interest under the fifth amendment was violated 
because of the way the government action "operated to bestow a badge of 
disloyalty or infamy, with an attendant foreclosure from other employ-
ment opportunity."139 
The court noted that to state properly a claim of an infringement of 
a fifth amendment liberty interest, a plaintiff must allege that the charges 
made against her were false, and that the charges were disclosed in such 
a manner that impaired the plaintiffs interest in her "good name, reputa-
tion, honor, or integrity."I40 The court ruled that both elements were 
properly alleged. 141 
133.Id. 
134. Id. at 547. 
135. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982). 
136. Id. § 552a(e)(5). 
137. Doe, 483 F. Supp. at 548. 
138. Id. at 549. 
139. Id. at 569 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961), and 
citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 705 (1976) (emphasis added in Paul, here 
deleted». 
140. Doe, 483 F. Supp. at 568 (quoting Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976». 
141. Doe, 483 F. Supp. at 570-71. The court noted that because the body receiving the 
information on Doe was composed of "influential citizens" from around the COun-
try, and because the file information could be used again if Doe reapplied for the 
fellowship or for other federal service, the derogatory charges were not merely told 
orally to Doe. Id. 
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Agreeing with the Tenth Circuit,142 the Doe court stated that when 
the circumstances of preservation of the allegedly false information cre-
ate "a great potential for damaging disclosure," the reviewing court 
should "relax the rigid publication requirement."143 This apparent dis-
crepancy with the Bishop holding comports with good fifth amendment 
due process jurisprudence, where the usual remedy sought for a liberty 
infringement is "an opportunity to refute the charge."I44 The equity 
powers of the federal judiciary have always been broadly interpreted,14S 
and where employment files contain false information presenting a threat 
to a former employee's employment prospects, a federal court may well 
be within its authority in ordering a hearing to give the former employee 
a chance to clear his name and to avoid a threatened liberty 
infringement. 
The Doe court, however, took an extraordinary step. After deciding 
that such a hearing would be appropriate relief in a more traditional ac-
tion, it allowed the plaintiff to pursue a Bivens-style action,l46 even 
though the potential injury from the allegedly false information could 
only occur in a future attempt to secure federal employment. To deter-
mine whether a Bivens-style action against the governmental officials in 
their individual capacities was proper, the court looked to language in 
Davis v. Passman.l47 Doe was permitted to pursue her cause of action for 
damages against the individual defendants under the fifth amendment 
because she had "no other means of securing total monetary relief [if she 
were to establish] compensable losses."148 The court reached this con-
clusion after noting that damages under the Privacy Act, which were also 
sought by Doe, would be limited to her post-effective date injuries, and 
that sovereign immunity barred recovery from the Civil Service 
Commission. 149 
The Doe court also looked to whether an award of damages would 
be "appropriate" for the violation of fifth amendment rights, 1 so a require-
ment set forth by the Davis Court. lSI It pointed to language in Davis 
that damages have been regarded as the usual remedy for invasions of 
142. McGhee v. Draper, 564 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1977). 
143. Doe v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 483 F. Supp. at S71 (quoting Doe v. 
Anker, 451 F. Supp. 241, 252 n.18 (S.D. N.Y. 1978)). 
144. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,573 (1972), quoted in Codd 
v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977). 
145. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388,404 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
146. Doe, 483 F. Supp. at 574. 
147. 442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979). The Davis Court stated that "litigants who allege that 
their own constitutional rights have been violated, and who at the same time have 
no effective means other than the judiciary to enforce these rights, must be able to 
invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable 
constitutional rights." [d. 
148. Doe, 483 F. Supp. at 574. 
149. [d. 
150. [d. 
151. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. at 228, 245 (1979). 
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personal liberty interests, IS2 and noted that in enacting the Privacy Act, 
Congress authorized damages awards for just the type of conduct alleged 
by Doe. 1S3 Congress must have decided, the court stated, that the proper 
amount of damages could be calculated in a "judicially manageable" 
fashion. 1s4 
Furthermore, the court was not convinced that allowing Doe's cause 
of action for damages against the officials in their individual capacities 
would "open the floodgates" of litigation. The events in question were 
not typical, the court noted, and the claim related in part to events occur-
ring before the effective date of the Privacy Act.1SS 
Davis had indicated that lawsuits against some officials may raise 
"special concerns counselling hesitation,"ls6 such as the suit in that case 
against a former congressman by an employee he had discharged in vio-
lation of her equal protection rights. The Davis Court noted, however, 
that those concerns were coextensive with the protections of the speech 
or debate clause of the Constitution,1s7 and to the extent the congress-
man was not protected by that clause, he should be as bound by the law 
as are "ordinary persons."lS8 Without deciding the issue, the Doe court 
likewise stated that any special concerns about holding the individual 
defendants subject to suit were coextensive with the scope of their official 
immunity}S9 To the extent those officials were not so protected, Doe 
was allowed to pursue her claims against them. l60 
Although preceding Bush v. Lucas161 by some three years, Doe re-
mains forceful precedent. Doe's detailed treatment of the policy-type 
concerns of Bivens cases is still a persuasive analysis, and since the plain-
tiff in Doe was not a member of the competitive service,162 the Bush hold-
ing does not apply to cases with facts similar to Doe. 
b. The Property Interest 
The fifth amendment prohibits the deprivation of property without 
due process of law; yet there is no constitutional definition of property. 
An independent source of property rights must thus be analyzed to deter-
mine the extent of those rights in each case. Property interests have been 
recognized in a variety of forms, apart from the traditional forms of real 
estate and chattels normally associated with property interests. The 
152. Doe, 483 F. Supp. at 574 (citing Davis, 442 U.S. at 245). 
153. Doe, 483 F. Supp. at 575 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(A». 
154. Doe, 483 F. Supp. at 575 (quoting Davis, 442 U.S. at 245). 
155. Doe, 483 F. Supp. at 575. 
156. Davis, 442 U.S. at 246. 
157. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
158. Davis, 442 U.S. at 246 (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615 (1972». 
159. Doe, 483 F. Supp. at 574-75. 
160.Id. 
161. 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983). 
162. Doe, 483 F. Supp. at 546-47. Indeed, she was not an employee at all, but only an 
applicant for a special employment program. Id. 
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leading case of Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth 163 attempted to 
draw some boundaries around protected property interests in this area of 
"intangible" property. 
To have a property interest in a "benefit," the Court stated, a person 
must have more than an "abstract need or desire for it" or "more than a 
unilateral expectation of it"; he must have a "legitimate claim of entitle-
ment to it."I64 The legitimacy of that claim of entitlement is determined 
by "rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support 
claims of entitlement to those benefits."16s 
Thus, the plaintiff in Roth, who had only a year-to-year contract 
with a state university system, could not claim an infringement of his 
fifth amendment property interest, made applicable to the state through 
the fourteenth amendment, when he was terminated at the end of his 
. contract without a hearing. 166 On the other hand, the plaintiff in a com-
panion case, Perry v. Sindermann,167 did allege a property interest in con-
tinued employment where the state college, although having no formal 
tenure system, allegedly had long followed a clear program of granting 
permanent tenure to those teachers performing adequately and cooperat-
ing with their colleagues. 168 
Perry was remanded by the Supreme Court for a finding as to 
whether the "policies and practices of the institution" had created a 
property interest the plaintiff could legitimately claim. 169 The apparent 
open texture of the directive on remand, however, seems to have en-
couraged the lower courts to find a property interest much more liberally 
than Roth and Perry probably intended. 
The Seventh Circuit, for example, has held that a departmental 
handbook that indicated "tenure" was provided for certain groups of em-
ployees created a presumption of a contractual tenure system.!'o Also, 
the District of Columbia Circuit has held that a property interest in re-
taining employment was created by an employee handbook indicating 
that satisfactory work would ensure the employee's continued employ-
ment, even though the employee of the agency was not in the competitive 
civil service.!'1 
These cases are clearly at odds with the rule that the federal govern-
ment cannot be bound by statements made ostensibly on its behalf by 
163. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
164. /d. at 577. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 579. 
167. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
168. Id. at 603. 
169. Id. (quoting Sinderman v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 943 (5th Cir. 1970». 
170. Paige v. Harris, 584 F.2d 178, 182 (7th Cir. 1978) (an action brought by an attor-
ney, a member of the excepted service, against his employer, the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development). 
171. Ashton v. Civiletti, 613 F.2d 923, 929-30 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (an action brought by a 
non-investigatory employee of the FBI). 
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those not having the authority to do so.172 If the employee handbooks 
did not correctly reflect the nature of tenure as created under the civil 
service laws, their pronouncements could not establish property interests. 
That the courts referred to above were so quick to recognize property 
interests reflects a misunderstanding of federal employment that may be 
widespread in the jUdiciary. 
Operating under this misunderstanding in a more traditional fifth 
amendment property case will not cause a large amount of harm, consid-
ering that the typical remedy will be to order a hearing, either before or 
after discharge,173 along with back pay in appropriate circumstances. 174 
The relative ease with which courts have found property interests in 
these cases, in which the remedies have been somewhat benign, has estab-
lished precedent that will make it all the easier to recognize Bivens-style 
actions in this area. Once courts find constitutional violations by federal 
officials, the broad directives of Carlson 17s almost ensure that constitu-
tional tort suits against those officials will be upheld, so long as factors 
"counselling hesitation," such as those in Bush, are not present. 
D. Defenses to Bivens Actions 
Although Bush was not concerned with the issue, affirmative de-
fenses arising out of the defendant's status or conduct may be raised in 
Bivens-style cases under appropriate circumstances. These circumstances 
include official immunity and good faith defenses. 
1. Official Immunity 
The Supreme Court held in Butz v. EconomJu 176 that the only fed-
eral officials enjoying absolute immunity from damages liability are attor-
neys presenting evidence in adjudicatory hearings, and officials otherwise 
performing prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions.177 Other federal 
172. Fiorentino v. United States, 007 F.2d 963, 967-69 (Ct. Cl. 1979), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 1083 (1980). 
173. See Arnett V. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (plurality opinion), reh'gdenied, 417 U.S. 977 
(1974), in which six justices, three in dissenting opinions and three dissenting in part 
with the plurality, concluded that a discharged non-probationary civil service em-
ployee must be granted a trial-type hearing at some stage in the discharge proceed-
ings. These opinions disagreed as to when the hearing should be in order to 
comport with fifth amendment due process requirements. See infra notes 205-14 and 
accompanying text. 
174. The Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(1) (1982), provides for the payment of back 
pay to an employee who has lost pay due to "an unjustified or unwarranted person-
nel action." 
175. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45. 
176. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
177. ld. at 514-17. Butz did not mention whether an absolute immunity extends to fed-
eral officials performing a rule making function analogous to the article I, § 6, cl. 1 
immunity granted to congressmen under the speech or debate clause of the Consti-
tution. One case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), Duchesne V. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 
817 (2d Cir. 1977), would recognize only a qualified immunity for state officials 
responsible for the adoption of the rules in an agency procedural manual; but cf. 
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officials, the Court stated, are relegated to a qualified immunity, as their 
state counterparts had been in actions brought against them pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 178 The Butz Court allowed the qualified immunity to 
extend to "mere mistakes in judgment," including those of law or fact, 179 
but it refused to adopt a rule under which "executive officers generally 
may with impunity discharge their duties in a way that is known to them 
to violate the United States Constitution or in a manner that they should 
know transgresses a clearly established constitutional rule."180 
The Butz holding did not, and perhaps could not, provide clear 
enough guidelines to ensure that frivolous lawsuits will be "quickly ter-
minated by federal courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading."181 
Although Butz indicated that immunity questions could be resolved early 
enough in a proceeding to protect defendant officials from undue harrass-
ment in litigation, experience has not borne this out. Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,182 Davis v. 
Passman,183 Carlson v. Green,184 and Doe v. United States Civil Service 
Commission 185 decided only the questions of whether a cause of action 
existed, leaving the official immunity questions for later resolution. These 
courts thus indicated that immunity is not so much a bar to suit in these 
cases as it is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved. 
Indeed, those immunity cases decided within the context of section 
1983186 actions that were cited and adopted by Butz for Bivens-style ac-
tions against federal officials indicated that intent and conduct are crucial 
to the determination of the existence of immunity from suit. 187 Thus, 
factual issues are raised that cannot be disposed of at the pleading stage 
of litigation. 188 
2. Good Faith 
The good faith of the officer in performing the conduct at issue in a 
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (holding that the President of the United 
States is absolutely immune from damages for acts within the "outer perimeter" of 
his official responsibility). 
178. Butz, 438 U.S. at 504-07. 
179. Id. at 507. 
180.Id. 
181. Id. 
182. 403 U.S. 388, 397-98 (1971). 
183. 442 U.S. 226, 249 (1979). 
184. 446 U.S. at 14, 19 (1980). 
185. 483 F. Supp. at 539, 574-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
186. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). 
187. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 486-95. 
188. The official immunity question is one that will become increasingly important as 
more Bivens-type actions are brought. Further research in this area would certainly 
be useful. The following thoughtful articles provide a solid foundation upon which 
this further research may proceed: Schroeder, Dete"ing Fourth Amendment Viola-
tions: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1390-96 (1981); Ber-
mann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 
1175 (1977). 
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Bivens action will be a defense in most cases. 189 The element of good 
faith is often considered in conjunction with the scope of the defendant's 
authority. Even malicious intent will not expose to liability an official 
who is not violating the Constitution and who is acting within his author-
ity;190 but good faith is no defense when that authority has been 
exceeded. 191 
The good faith issue is one for the finder of fact. When that defense 
is raised, whether it is denominated a defense or an element of a claim of 
official immunity, the litigation will probably go to extensive discovery, 
even though the good faith defense may be valid. In an adverse person-
nel action, bad feelings between the employee and supervisor may dis-
pose a discharged employee to be dubious of the supervisor's claim of 
good faith. The result in many cases will be hard-fought litigation and, 
ultimately, pressure on the defendant to settle a case with a valid defense. 
IV. FURTHER REMEDIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The principal impediment left by Bush to Bivens-style actions will be 
the status of the plaintiff-employee. According to Bush, if the employee 
enjoys a statutory remedy substantially as complete as the administrative 
appeal of adverse actions, he must seek redress through that statutory 
procedure; otherwise, his Bivens claim will be allowed. 192 Regardless of 
the type of constitutional interests involved, the federal judiciary will rec-
ognize the right to bring a private action for damages when the statutory 
remedies are non-existent or, even though available, cross that undefined 
margin beyond which constitutional rights are inadequately protected. 
A. A Right without a Remedy: A Contradiction of Terms? 
Any Bivens case breaking new ground in the public personnel area 
must weigh carefully the employee's interests at issue and consider the 
best means of effectuating those interests. While Bush rejected the ex-
treme view that the federal judiciary must "fashion an adequate remedy 
for every wrong that can be proved in a case over which a court has 
jurisdiction,"193 the Court likewise refused to limit the remedial powers 
189. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 
1348 (2d Cir. 1972), on remand from 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The good faith of the 
officer has been held to be a defense in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) actions. See, e.g., 
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967). 
190. See, e.g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896), discussed in Butz v. Economou, 438 
U.S. 478,492-95 (1978). 
191. See, e.g., Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877), cited in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 
478, 490-91 (1978); Kelley v. Dune, 344 F.2d 129, 133 (1st Cir. 1965); Hughes v. 
Johnson, 305 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1962). For further discussion, see Schroeder, 
supra note 188, at 1386-96. 
192. Bush, 103 S. Ct. at 2416. 
193. Id. at 2408. 
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of federal courts to just that "relief expressly authorized by Congress." 194 
The Bush Court stated that the federal courts' power to grant relief not 
expressly authorized by Congress is "firmly established."19s It stressed 
that the grant of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,196 known as "fed-
eral question" jurisdiction, carries with it not only the power to decide 
whether the allegation of a constitutional infringement states a cause of 
action,197 but also the "authority to choose among available judicial rem-
edies in order to vindicate constitutional rights."198 
Having stated this, the Court was committed to considering in detail 
the administrative remedies available to Bush before it could determine 
whether his suit could stand. Of course, Bivens held that the administra-
tive remedies were sufficient to foreclose a judicial remedy in that case. 199 
But does it necessarily follow that in the absence of an administrative 
remedy, due to a choice by Congress that such relief is inappropriate, a 
judicial remedy must be created? 
194. 103 S. Ct. at 2408. In note 10, the Court cited Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch"137, 
162-63 (1803), which quoted the following from Blackstone: 
[ilt is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, 
there is also a legal remedy by suit, or action at law, whenever that right is 
invaded. . . . [I]t is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of Eng-
land, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every in-
jury its proper redress. 
3 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES· 23,109. See also Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 
U.S. 184, 190 (1964), in which Justice Brennan wrote: "to read a sovereign immu-
nity exception into the [Federal Employers' Liability] Act would result ... in a 
right without a remedy .... We are unwilling to conclude that Congress intended 
so pointless and frustrating a result. : .. " In Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 
188-91 (1958), Justice Whittaker, in allowing judicial review of the National Labor 
Relations Board representation decision, wrote: 
Does the law, "apart from the review provisions of the ... act," afford a 
remedy? We think the answer surely must be yes. This suit is not one to 
"review," in the sense of that term as used in the Act, a decision of the 
Board made within its jurisdiction. Rather it is one to strike down an 
order of the Board made in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to 
a specific prohibition in the act. . . . Plainly, this was an attempted exer-
cise of power that had been specifically withheld. It deprived the profes-
sional employees of a "right" assured to them by Congress. Surely, in 
these circumstances, a Federal District Court has jurisdiction of an origi-
nal suit to prevent deprivation of a right so given. 
Here,. . . "absence of jurisdiction of the federal courts" would mean 
"a sacrifice or obliteration of a right which Congress" has given profes-
sional employees, for there is no other means within their control. . . to 
protect and enforce that right . . . . 
Where, as here, Congress has given a "right" to the professional em-
ployees it must be held that it intended that right to be enforced, and the 
"courts ... encounter no difficulty in fulfilling its purpose." 
358 U.S. at 188-91. 
195. Bush, 103 S. Ct. at 2409. 
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982); see supra note 29. 
197. Bush, 103 S. Ct. at 2409 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946». 
198. Bush, 103 S. Ct. at 2409. 
199. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. 
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It is unlikely that the Supreme Court would accept an explicit state-
ment or implied policy from Congress that a particular classification of 
federal employees is of such a status that those in that classification are 
entitled to neither a statutory nor a court-made remedy for personnel 
actions arguably violating their constitutional rights.2OO Although the 
power of Congress to limit the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary has 
been recognized in a variety of circumstances,201 it is a different matter to 
preclude all forums, judicial and statutory, from vindicating a constitu-
tional right. 202 The Court has applied the "no right without a remedy" 
rationale in the past,203 and Bush indicates that the Court will not hesi-
tate to do so again in such a situation.204 
In Arnett v. Kennedy,20S a three-justice plurality indicated that Con-
gress could limit the avenues of redress for a federal employee based 
upon Congress's definition of the employee's status. The issue was 
whether the due process rights of the plaintiff, a former non-probationary 
employee in the competitive service, were violated by the statute and reg-
ulations that did not provide for a trial-type hearing until after termina-
tion by the employing agency.206 Mr. Justice Rehnquist and two 
concurring justices focused on the remedial procedures created by the 
statute creating the property interest. The statute prohibited removal of 
the plaintiff except for "such cause as will promote the efficiency of the 
200. Perhaps this statement is overly broad, as employees holding positions of a confiden-
tial or policy-determining nature (such as those in Schedule C of the excepted ser-
vice, see 5 C.F.R. §§ 213.3301-.3302 (1984) may not be entitled to the same first 
amendment protections as other employees, because their private political beliefs 
could interfere with "the effective performance of the public office involved." See 
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1979); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). See 
also Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). Indeed, all federal employees are sub-
ject to some first amendment restrictions, as in the Hatch Act's prohibition of cer-
tain political activities. 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1982); see Civil Service Commission v. 
Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973). The issue addressed here, how-
ever, is whether, insofar as a constitutional interest is enjoyed by employees, Con-
gress may restrict access to remedies for violations of that interest. 
201. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 539 F. Supp. 1062 (E.D. Tenn. 1982) (finding 
that 38 U.S.C. § 211 (1982) precluded the defendant from obtaining judicial review 
of the merits of his Veterans Administration claim. The court indicated it would 
have reviewed his case had he challenged the constitutionality of the applicable stat-
ute). See also Am. Fed. Gov't Employees v. Nimmo, 536 F. Supp. 707 (E.D. Va. 
1982), modified on appeal, 711 F.2d 28 (4th Cir. 1983). 
202. See Am. Fed. Gov't Employees v. Nimmo, 536 F. Supp. 707 (E.D. Va. 1982). 
203. See supra note 194.' 
204. Bush, 103 S. Ct. at 2409. It may be worth noting that this sense of "no right with-
out a remedy" differs from the legal realist approach of Holmes, in which the con-
cept of right and remedy fused only in the sense that the latter defined the former. 
See Holmes, The Path 0/ the Law, 10 MARV. L. REv. 457 (1897). (The realists' 
"scientific approach" focused on "what judges do, rather than what they say." R. 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 3 (1978». The Bivens line of cases seems 
to accord an independent existence to the constitutional rights involved, with reme-
dies serving not so much as "to give birth" to rights, but rather to be selected out of 
an appreciation of "moral-like" qualities of the rights. 
205. 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (plurality opinion). 
206. Id. at 140, 144 n.12, 145 n.14. 
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service."207 Because, however, the statute gave no right to a pre-termina-
tion trial-type hearing,208 "the property interest which [the plaintift] had 
in his employment was itself conditioned by the procedural limitations 
which had accompanied the grant of that interest. "209 
No other Justice agreed with this view. Two concurring Justices 
emphasized that the right to procedural due process is guaranteed by the 
Constitution, not by statute, and thus the right could not be limited by 
statute;210 they concurred in the result, however, after balancing the in-
terests of federal employees in their employment with the government's 
interest in the expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees.2l1 Mr. 
Justice White, concurring in part and dissenting in part, found that the 
pre-termination procedures were constitutionally sufficient, although an 
evidentiary hearing would be required at some time in the proceed-
ings.212 The three dissenters would have held that the Constitution re-
quired a trial-type hearing before termination.213 
Arnett's rejection of the view that the constitutional right to due pro-
cess can be "conditioned" by statutory procedures214 is significant for 
present purposes. That rejection, coupled with Bush's careful analysis of 
the adverse action appeal procedures before denying the Bivens action in 
that case, shows the Court's dedication to ensuring that constitutional 
rights are adequately effected in statutory remedial procedures. Congress 
may not implicitly or explicitly limit employees' constitutional rights 
merely by denying them certain statutory remedies. 
207. Id. at 140 (citing and quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (1970». 
208. A post-tennination trial-type hearing before the Civil Service Commission was pro-
vided for in the regulations. See supra note 206. 
209. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 155. This statement shows a misunderstanding of the interests 
involved. The property interest is created by an independent source, such as a stat-
ute, while the right to procedural due process is created by the Constitution. Bd. of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). To say that the property interest is 
"conditioned" by the statutory procedures ignores the possibility that those proce-
dures conflict with the constitutional requirements of due process. 
210. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 167 (powell and Blackmun, 11., concurring in the result and 
concurring in part). 
211. Id. at 167-68. 
212. Id. at 185, 195-96 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Mr. Justice 
White, however, found the pre-tennination opportunity to answer the charges orally 
or in writing to be constitutionally infirm because the official hearing the response 
was an employee of the employing agency. Justice White thus would have had the 
appellee reinstated with back pay. Id. at 202. 
213. Id. at 206 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
214. It may be argued that Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), followed the Arnett 
plurality opinion of Justice Rehnquist (thereby overruling the "majority"), because 
it deferred to an interpretation by the district court of an ordinance that appeared to 
protect the jobs of "permanent" employees so long as they were not "negligent, 
inefficient, or unfit to perform" their duties. Id. at 344 n.5, 344-47 (quoting Marion, 
North Carolina Personnel Ordinance, art II, § 6). The district court had found, 
however, that no property right was created by the ordinance, and the Supreme 
Court affirmed. Bishop, 426 U.S. at 347. 
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B. Gaps in Current Statutory Remedies 
The question raised earlier still remains. Does it make sense to rele-
gate non-probationary employees in the competitive service to their ad-
ministrative remedies, while employees in the excepted service, accorded 
less protection in the statutory scheme, are free to pursue more lucrative 
Bivens-style actions? This anomaly created by Bush appears unsolvable 
under the present remedial scheme, and a new revision of the civil service 
system may be called for. 
Since employees in the excepted service, probationers in the compet-
itive service, and non-preference eligibles in the United States Postal Ser-
vice do not have a property interest in their positions,2ls the 
requirements of constitutional due process do not come into play merely 
by virtue of an adverse action terminating, suspending, or downgrading 
their positions. To that extent, Congress may effectively legislate limita-
tions on the rights in an area of potential constitutional implications. 
Where other constitutional interests are involved, however, such as the 
fifth amendment liberty interest or the first amendment freedom of 
speech, Congress's role is different. The liberty interest and freedom of 
speech are naturally enjoyed and do not depend on congressional action 
for their genesis. Congress is free to establish procedures to remedy their 
breach, however, and has done so with some procedures available to fed-
eral employees in various instances. 
As discussed in Doe v. United States Civil Service Commission,216 the 
Privacy Act217 provides relief for a liberty interest infringement when an 
agency fails to maintain its records on an individual accurately and 
fairly.2lB The individual may bring an action against the agency in fed- . 
eral district court for amendment of the records219 and, if the agency's 
actions were intentional or willful, for actual damages.220 As some of the 
injuries of the plaintiff in Doe occurred before the effective date of the 
Privacy Act, the plaintiff was allowed to pursue Bivens-style remedies 
against the individual defendants,221 the implication being that the Pri-
vacy Act remedies may have been sufficient to redress the constitutional 
violation had they been effective at the time of the violation. 
A less certain remedy is available in the case of first amendment 
215. See supra note 103. A possible exception exists in the case of non-preference 
eligibles in the Postal Service. They, like their preference eligible co-workers, are 
typically given the protection in a collective bargaining agreement that they be ter-
minated or otherwise disciplined only for "just cause." See supra note 108. Argua-
bly, the inclusion of this requirement in the collective bargaining agreement is the 
grant of a property interest by the government that requires due process protection. 
Since the agreement also provides a detailed grievance and arbitration procedure, 
however, it is also arguable that under Bush, Bivens-style remedies are not available. 
216. 483 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
217. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982). 
218. Id. § 5S2a(g)(l)(c) (1982). 
219. Id. § 552a(g)(2) (1982). 
220. Id. § 552a(g)(4) (1982). 
221. Doe, 483 F. Supp. at 574-75. 
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violations; thus, it is the area most ripe for Bivens-style actions. The 
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 included within its "prohibited person-
nel practices" a protection against disciplining "whistleblowers," those 
who make public statements critical of agency practices.222 The office of 
the Special Counsel of the Merit Systems Protection Board is empowered 
to investigate complaints of prohibited personnel practices and to prose-
cute them in federal district court, but such prosecution is completely 
discretionary.223 While the commission of a prohibited personnel prac-
tice is automatic grounds for reinstatement of a non-probationary em-
ployee in the competitive service or a preference eligible,224 it affords 
those in the excepted service no more than the right to request the special 
counsel to investigate the matter and to consider bringing an action 
before the MSPB. Little need be said at this point about the inadequacy 
of such a remedy to ensure the effectuation of first amendment rights and 
thereby to preclude the need for Bivens-style actions.225 
Another wrinkle in the remedial structure of the Civil Service Re-
form Act exists in the performance appraisal system it created.226 Under 
this system, employees are evaluated yearly in various "critical" and 
"non-critical" elements of performance applicable to their positions.227 
Removal is justified when the agency can show by "substantial evidence" 
that there was "unacceptable performance" in a critical element. 228 The 
appeals procedures available to those undergoing termination or a reduc-
tion in grade because of an unacceptable performance appraisal is mini-
mal. While the remedy of reinstatement or upgrading and back pay229 
may be deemed sufficient by many courts to preclude the need for a Biv-
ens-style action, the substantial evidence standard can make it difficult 
for a meritorious employee to rebut the employing agency's case by 
showing the personnel action was in violation of some constitutional in-
terest (such as a first amendment freedom from retaliation against pro-
tected speech).230 In such a case, the right to pursue a Bivens-style 
remedy may be deemed crucial by a federal court. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Thus construed, the current structure of statutory remedies leaves 
222. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301(b)(8)(A), 2302(b)(8) (1982). 
223. 5 C.F.R. §§ 1250.1-.3 (1984). 
224. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(B) (1982). 
225. See supra note 109. 
226. 5 U.S.C. §§ 4301-04 (1982). 
227. [d. § 4302(b)(1) (1982). 
228. [d. § 7701(c)(I)(A) (1982); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a)(i) (1983). 
229. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.111(b)(2) (1984) states that the decisions of Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board presiding officials shall include the "appropriate relief." 
230. See Passman, 78 Reform Act Eases Firings, 19:44 Federal Times 12 (December 26, 
1983) (asserting that the testimony of a supervisor and one other witness concerning 
unsatisfactory performance is very difficult for an employee to overcome under the 
"substantial evidence" test) (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B, 340 U.S. 
474 (1951». 
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supervisors of federal employees exposed to suits for damages in a variety 
of circumstances. Where the statutory remedies for employees are weak-
est, an uncalibrated sliding scale used by courts to evaluate remedies will 
indicate that the need for Bivens-style actions is strongest. Also, as Doe 
v. United States Civil Service Commission 231 demonstrated, a supervisor's 
conduct need not be particularly out of line with his usual duties to vio-
late an employee's constitutional rights. 
It would seem to be the height of managerial inefficiency to place 
supervisors in a position where they must fear for their own liability 
whenever a personnel decision is made. No company in private industry 
would put its supervisors in such an exposed position. It would be much 
more effective from a managerial standpoint to ensure that employees' 
only legal recourse for personnel actions is against the government rather 
than against their supervisors; supervisors would then be free to act when 
the merits of the situation call for action. The cost to government of 
such a remedial system need not be significantly greater, if at all, than the 
savings through more efficient government. 
The appropriate alternative system "should adequately serve tort 
laws' compensatory, deterrent, and retributive purposes without unduly 
inhibiting official initiative."232 Government, the entity with the greater 
ability to spread the cost of litigation, can most effectively satisfy the 
compensatory purpose. Furthermore, deterrent and retributive purposes 
in the personnel field can much more effectively be handled by govern-
ment than by employees and former employees, with whom supervisors 
ought to have the best working relationship possible. Administrative sys-
tems of discipline and discharge of the offending officials will best be es-
tablished by Congress, which has the greatest interest in seeing that those 
systems are kept effective and up-to-date with the functioning of modern 
civil service. 
As one commentator put it, "the emerging coexistence of govern-
mental and officer liability has created a new problem of coordination," 
with significant need "of integrating governmental and officer liability so 
as to accommodate the purposes that the law of governmental torts may 
appropriately be asked to serve."233 Congress has grappled with this 
problem for several years by considering legislation that would provide 
an action directly against the government, either alternatively or exclu-
sively, for individuals injured by the constitutional torts of federal offi-
cials.234 One recent proposaF35 would have amended the Federal Tort 
Claims Act to provide for an exclusive remedy against the government 
for such conduct, as well as allowing the injured parties to participate in 
231. 483 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
232. Bermann, supra note 188 at 1202. 
233. See id. at 1175-76. 
234. See, e.g., S. 695, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 2659, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979); H.R. 9219, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
235. H.R. 24, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
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disciplinary proceedings against the offending officials. It would have ap-
plied to all government actions, not just personnel actions, which may 
have contributed to its lack of support. 
A statute more limited in scope would have a better chance of pas-
sage. As already seen, current statutory remedies are weakest for liberty 
interest infringements not covered by the Privacy Act, retaliations 
against whistleblowers in the excepted service, and unacceptable per-
formance appraisals. Other weaknesses may yet be uncovered through 
further study. A carefully drafted amendment to the Federal Tort Claims 
Act of the Civil Service Reform Act to provide an exclusive remedy 
against the government in such situations may be a workable solution to 
the dilemma. 
All of the implications of Bush on the kinds of Bivens-style actions 
that will be accepted by the courts can only be revealed on a case-by-case 
basis. It is already clear, however, that if Congress does not act to com-
plete the remedial scheme begun in 1978 with the Civil Service Reform 
Act, the goals of the United States civil service of efficiency and fair treat-
ment will be in jeopardy. . 
